Legislature(2003 - 2004)
05/05/2003 03:15 PM House JUD
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* first hearing in first committee of referral
+ teleconferenced
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+ teleconferenced
= bill was previously heard/scheduled
ALASKA STATE LEGISLATURE
HOUSE JUDICIARY STANDING COMMITTEE
May 5, 2003
3:15 p.m.
MEMBERS PRESENT
Representative Lesil McGuire, Chair
Representative Tom Anderson, Vice Chair
Representative Jim Holm
Representative Dan Ogg
Representative Ralph Samuels
Representative Les Gara
Representative Max Gruenberg
MEMBERS ABSENT
All members present
COMMITTEE CALENDAR
SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 10
Relating to the Pledge of Allegiance.
- MOVED HCS SJR 10(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
SENATE BILL NO. 87
"An Act relating to principal and income in the administration
of trusts and decedents' estates and the mental health trust
fund; adopting a version of the Uniform Principal and Income
Act; and providing for an effective date."
- MOVED HCS SB 87(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
CONFIRMATION HEARING
Commission on Judicial Conduct
Richard L. Burton - Ketchikan
- CONFIRMATION ADVANCED
HOUSE BILL NO. 245
"An Act relating to certain suits and claims by members of the
military services or regarding acts or omissions of the
organized militia; relating to liability arising out of certain
search and rescue, civil defense, homeland security, and fire
management and firefighting activities; and providing for an
effective date."
- MOVED CSHB 245(JUD) OUT OF COMMITTEE
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 4
Proposing an amendment to the Constitution of the State of
Alaska relating to the duration of a regular session.
- SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
HOUSE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 20
Proposing amendments to the Constitution of the State of Alaska
repealing the prohibition on dedicated funds.
- SCHEDULED BUT NOT HEARD
HOUSE BILL NO. 145
"An Act relating to public interest litigants and to attorney
fees; and amending Rule 82, Alaska Rules of Civil Procedure."
- BILL HEARING POSTPONED
PREVIOUS ACTION
BILL: SJR 10
SHORT TITLE:PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE RESOLUTION
SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) GREEN
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
03/10/03 0449 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
03/10/03 0449 (S) STA
03/18/03 (S) STA AT 3:30 PM BELTZ 211
03/18/03 (S) Moved Out of Committee
03/18/03 (S) MINUTE(STA)
03/20/03 0550 (S) STA RPT 4DP
03/20/03 0550 (S) DP: STEVENS G, COWDERY,
DYSON, GUESS
03/20/03 0550 (S) FN1: ZERO(S.STA)
03/26/03 0593 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 3/26/2003
03/26/03 0593 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME
03/26/03 0593 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING
UNAN CONSENT
03/26/03 0593 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME SJR 10
03/26/03 0593 (S) PASSED Y19 N- A1
03/26/03 0595 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H)
03/26/03 0595 (S) VERSION: SJR 10
03/28/03 0664 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
03/28/03 0664 (H) JUD
03/28/03 0689 (H) CROSS SPONSOR(S): LYNN,
WILSON
04/07/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/07/03 (H) <Bill Hearing Postponed>
05/02/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
05/02/03 (H) <Bill Hearing Postponed to
5/5>
05/05/03 1333 (H) CROSS SPONSOR(S): HOLM
05/05/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: SB 87
SHORT TITLE:PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
SPONSOR(S): SENATOR(S) SEEKINS
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
02/28/03 0298 (S) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
02/28/03 0298 (S) JUD
04/14/03 (S) JUD AT 1:00 PM BELTZ 211
04/14/03 (S) Moved Out of Committee --
MINUTE(JUD)
04/15/03 0858 (S) JUD RPT 3DP 2NR
04/15/03 0858 (S) DP: SEEKINS, THERRIAULT,
ELLIS;
04/15/03 0858 (S) NR: OGAN, FRENCH
04/15/03 0858 (S) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
04/16/03 0876 (S) RULES TO CALENDAR 4/16/2003
04/16/03 0876 (S) READ THE SECOND TIME
04/16/03 0877 (S) ADVANCED TO THIRD READING
4/17 CALENDAR
04/17/03 0893 (S) READ THE THIRD TIME SB 87
04/17/03 0894 (S) PASSED Y17 N- E3
04/17/03 0894 (S) EFFECTIVE DATE(S) SAME AS
PASSAGE
04/17/03 0895 (S) TRANSMITTED TO (H)
04/17/03 0895 (S) VERSION: SB 87
04/22/03 1045 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/22/03 1045 (H) JUD
05/02/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
05/02/03 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
05/05/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
BILL: HB 245
SHORT TITLE:SUITS & CLAIMS: MILITARY/FIRE/DEFENSE
SPONSOR(S): RLS BY REQUEST OF THE GOVERNOR
Jrn-Date Jrn-Page Action
04/04/03 0777 (H) READ THE FIRST TIME -
REFERRALS
04/04/03 0777 (H) MLV, JUD, FIN
04/04/03 0778 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
04/04/03 0778 (H) FN2: ZERO(DNR)
04/04/03 0778 (H) FN3: INDETERMINATE(ADM)
FORTHCOMING
04/04/03 0778 (H) GOVERNOR'S TRANSMITTAL LETTER
04/08/03 0859 (H) FN3: INDETERMINATE(ADM)
RECEIVED
04/11/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/11/03 (H) <Bill Hearing Postponed>
04/15/03 (H) MLV AT 3:00 PM CAPITOL 124
04/15/03 (H) Moved CSHB 245(MLV) Out of
Committee
04/15/03 (H) MINUTE(MLV)
04/16/03 1007 (H) MLV RPT CS(MLV) NT 1DP 2DNP
1NR 2AM
04/16/03 1007 (H) DP: LYNN; DNP: GRUENBERG,
CISSNA;
04/16/03 1007 (H) NR: MASEK; AM: WEYHRAUCH,
FATE
04/16/03 1008 (H) FN1: ZERO(LAW)
04/16/03 1008 (H) FN2: ZERO(DNR)
04/16/03 1008 (H) FN3: INDETERMINATE(ADM)
04/16/03 (H) JUD AT 8:00 AM CAPITOL 120
04/16/03 (H) <Bill Hearing Postponed>
04/28/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/28/03 (H) Heard & Held -- Meeting
Postponed to 2:00 PM --
MINUTE(JUD)
04/30/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
04/30/03 (H) Heard & Held Mtg. Postponed
to after Maj. Caucus
MINUTE(JUD)
05/02/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
05/02/03 (H) Scheduled But Not Heard
05/05/03 (H) JUD AT 1:00 PM CAPITOL 120
WITNESS REGISTER
JACQUELINE TUPOU, Staff
to Senator Lyda Green
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented SJR 10 on behalf of Senator
Green, sponsor.
BRIAN HOVE, Staff
to Senator Ralph Seekins
Alaska State Legislature
Juneau, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Presented SB 87 on behalf of Senator
Seekins, sponsor.
DAVID G. SHAFTEL, Attorney
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Assisted with the presentation of SB 87 and
responded to questions.
PHIL YOUNKER, SR., Chair
Executive Committee
Board of Trustees
Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority ("The Trust")
Fairbanks, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of SB 87, raised the
question of whether changes suggested by The Trust have been
incorporated into Version U, and encouraged passage of the bill.
STEPHEN E. GREER, Attorney
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified in support of SB 87.
RICHARD BURTON, Appointee
Commission on Judicial Conduct
Ketchikan, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: Testified as appointee to the Commission on
Judicial Conduct.
GAIL VOIGTLANDER, Assistant Attorney General
Special Litigation Section
Civil Division (Anchorage)
Department of Law (DOL)
Anchorage, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 245, on behalf of
the administration, provided comments on the proposed amendments
and responded to questions.
SAM JOHNSON, Assistant Commissioner
Office of Homeland Security
Department of Military & Veterans' Affairs (DMVA)
Fort Richardson, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 245, responded to
questions.
BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG E. CAMPBELL, Adjutant
General/Commissioner
Department of Military & Veterans' Affairs
Fort Richardson, Alaska
POSITION STATEMENT: During discussion of HB 245, responded to
questions.
ACTION NARRATIVE
TAPE 03-50, SIDE A
Number 0001
CHAIR LESIL McGUIRE called the House Judiciary Standing
Committee meeting to order at 3:15 p.m. Representatives
McGuire, Anderson, Ogg, Samuels, Gara, and Gruenberg were
present at the call to order. Representative Holm arrived as
the meeting was in progress. Chair McGuire noted that
Representative Anderson had to leave right then in order to
chair the House Labor and Commerce Standing Committee.
SJR 10 - PLEDGE OF ALLEGIANCE RESOLUTION
Number 0075
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the first order of business would
be SENATE JOINT RESOLUTION NO. 10, Relating to the Pledge of
Allegiance.
Number 0103
JACQUELINE TUPOU, Staff to Senator Lyda Green, Alaska State
Legislature, said on behalf of Senator Green, sponsor, that SJR
10 provides that the Alaska State Legislature supports a review
by the U.S. Supreme Court of the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals
2002 decision in Newdow v. U.S. Congress. In Newdow, the Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals ruled that the words "under God" in the
Pledge of Allegiance violate the establishment clause when
recited by students in public schools. She mentioned that the
U.S. Supreme Court had this case on its April 30 docket, and
that a petition for a [writ of certiorari] has been filed and a
response is expected back on May 30.
CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that no one else wished to
testify, closed public testimony on SJR 10. She then
complimented Ms. Tupou and Senator Green on a well-written
resolution; without making political statements, SJR 10 is
factual and "speaks to things that have occurred throughout
history."
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said he agrees with Chair McGuire. Noting
that the U.S. Supreme Court denies most [petitions for a writ of
certiorari], he asked whether there is any indication that this
case will be accepted.
MS. TUPOU said she didn't care to speculate on that issue.
Number 0387
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to adopt Conceptual
Amendment 1, to add the solicitor general to the list of those
who will get a copy of SJR 10. There being no objection,
Conceptual Amendment 1 was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG said he would like to echo Chair McGuire's
comments.
Number 0421
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report SJR 10, as amended, out
of committee with individual recommendations and the
accompanying zero fiscal note. There being no objection, HCS
SJR 10(JUD) was reported from the House Judiciary Standing
Committee.
The committee took an at-ease from 3:22 p.m. to 3:25 p.m.
SB 87 - PRINCIPAL AND INCOME
Number 0455
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the next order of business would be
SENATE BILL NO. 87, "An Act relating to principal and income in
the administration of trusts and decedents' estates and the
mental health trust fund; adopting a version of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act; and providing for an effective date."
Number 0511
BRIAN HOVE, Staff to Senator Ralph Seekins, Alaska State
Legislature, on behalf of Senator Seekins, sponsor, paraphrased
the sponsor statement, which read [original punctuation
provided]:
In 1984 the Alaska legislature adopted an early
version of the Uniform Principal and Income Act
(located in Statute 13.38). This Act provides rules
for the determination of whether a trust's or estate's
receipts should be considered income or principal.
This distinction is often important because some
beneficiaries may be entitled to income distributions,
and others may be entitled to principal distributions.
Senate Bill 87 updates the existing Statute to the
most recent (1997) version of the Uniform Principal
and Income Act.
The drafters of the 1997 Uniform Act have recognized
that there is a conflict between income and principal
beneficiaries, and this conflict creates pressures on
the fiduciary. The income beneficiaries want the
fiduciary to invest so as to maximize annual income.
The principal beneficiaries want the fiduciary to
invest for long term equity growth. As a result, a
trustee attempting to satisfy both sets of
beneficiaries will have to compromise with respect to
the choice of investments. Consequently, the total
return of the trust will suffer. Two techniques have
been adopted to avoid the need for such a compromise.
These techniques allow the trustee to choose
investment approaches which will maximize the total
investment return of the trust.
The first technique is provided by Article 1 of Senate
Bill 87, which gives the trustee the discretionary
power to adjust. This power allows the trustee to
reallocate receipts from income to principal, or vice
versa, when the trustee determines that it is fair and
reasonable to do so. The second technique is provided
by Article 2 which allows the trustee to convert a
trust to a unitrust. This is a trust which provides
that a certain percentage of its assets--often 4%--
will be distributed each year to the income
beneficiary.
Both of the above techniques will allow the trustee to
choose investment approaches which will maximize the
total return. As a result, both the income
beneficiary and the principal beneficiary will receive
greater distributions. Further, the trustee will not
be struggling with the conflict in investment
approaches.
As of January 2003, thirty state have adopted the 1997
Uniform Principal and Income Act. Of these, twelve
states have included the unitrust provisions. Senate
Bill 87 follows the legislation enacted by
Pennsylvania, which includes both techniques thereby
enabling the trustee to maximize total returns. The
State of Washington enacted this version in 2002.
Georgia is presently considering it this year.
MR. HOVE, in conclusion, urged passage of SB 87.
Number 0730
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to adopt the proposed committee
substitute (CS) for SB 87, Version 23-LS0366\U, Bannister,
5/2/03, as the work draft. There being no objection, Version U
was before the committee.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether there are any other aspects of
Version U that differ from the Uniform Principal and Income Act.
MR. HOVE mentioned that Version U contains language specific to
"our mental health trust fund."
Number 0854
DAVID G. SHAFTEL, Attorney, noted that he and Stephen E. Greer
are members of a group of trust and estate attorneys who have
worked with legislative staff on SB 87. In addition to
reiterating the points provided in the sponsor statement, he
noted that Alaska's current laws on this issue are 40 years out
of date, and that the changes provided in SB 87 are in keeping
with modern-day business practices, investment concepts, and tax
codes. He opined that the version of the Uniform Principal and
Income Act which is before the committee is the most
advantageous version.
MR. SHAFTEL, in response to Chair McGuire's question, relayed
that in addition to the unitrust provisions, which aren't part
of the 1997 Uniform Principal and Income Act, Version U contains
a provision - page 13, lines 5-9 - dealing with a recent
Internal Revenue Service (IRS) regulation change that denies an
income tax deduction for interest paid on pecuniary bequests.
He explained: "What we have done is, we have repealed our
interest statute, and instead we changed this [paragraph 2] so
that pecuniary bequests receive a pro rata share of the income
earned during the administration of an estate or a trust."
MR. SHAFTEL, regarding other changes to the Uniform Principal
and Income Act, said:
We also have made it clear that this Act [applies] to
revocable trusts as well as to estates. That is the
intention of the drafters of the [Uniform Principal
and Income Act] but several attorneys who've reviewed
... [it] have stated that they thought it would be
advantageous to underscore that, so there has been
language added which accomplishes that. We also have
worked with the representatives of the [Alaska Mental
Health Trust Authority] to put in language making this
uniform Act inapplicable to the [Alaska Mental Health
Trust Authority]; they want to handle principal and
income allocations ... according to future regulations
that will [be] adopted under that Act.
MR. SHAFTEL, in conclusion, said that all members of the group
that worked with legislative staff on this bill feel very
strongly that Version U is an excellent version of the Uniform
Principal and Income Act, and recommend that it be approved so
that "Alaskan residents can have the benefits of these modern
concepts."
Number 1149
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked, "If somebody has a trust agreement
that ... specifically defines who gets the principal, who gets
the income, and the agreement specifically defines principal and
income, would the change in the definition in this Act change
that existing agreement?"
MR. SHAFTEL replied that that is an excellent question and [his
group] hadn't addressed it. This Uniform Principal and Income
Act, like all previous Uniform Principal and Income Acts, only
provides default rules. Hence, if the creator of a trust
decides that he/she wants different rules to apply regarding
principal and income application, the rules in this Act can be
overridden by so saying in the trust instrument. There are many
types of allocations of principal and income, and to the extent
that the creator of a trust does not provide specific rules for
specific types of allocations, the default rules provided by SB
87 will apply if the need for those allocations arises during
the administration of the trust or estate.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said he didn't want passage of SB 87 to
disrupt any existing agreements. He asked whether SB 87 would
apply retroactively to a trust in which allocation of principal
and income has not been defined, thereby disrupting the
expectations of an existing trust's beneficiaries.
MR. SHAFTEL said that Senate Bill 87 will provide assistance to
the administrator of an instrument that does not address the
particular situations that arise when [income and principal
allocation] is not covered in that instrument. Specifically, SB
87 will apply to the administration of trusts that are already
in existence and [to] estates in the future that [rise] out of
wills that are already in existence. But if the person who
created that will or trust did not specifically address the
particular principal and income allocation in question, then SB
87 will provide the answer, if needed, in the future. But
again, if a trust or will already provides for a specific type
of income and principal allocation, those provisions will
override the defaults in SB 87.
MR. SHAFTEL added that the rules outlined in the Uniform
Principal and Income Act were arrived at by the National
Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws (NCCUSL); the
NCCUSL has approved these rules and recommends them for
enactment in all states. He mentioned that approximately 35
states have either adopted these rules or are considering their
adoption.
Number 1407
REPRESENTATIVE GARA replied:
I still want to be very careful that we're not
changing the amount of money that people are receiving
in income and principal distributions .... I
understand what you said, which is that agreements
will provide the allocation between interest and
income that somebody is entitled to as a beneficiary.
But in paragraph one of the sponsor statement, it says
here that we are also redefining the terms "income"
and "principal" so that if somebody is entitled to
income distributions, we're specifically defining what
an income distribution is, and if somebody is entitled
to principal distributions, we're specifically
defining what a principal distribution is.
And what I'm wondering is, if there are existing
agreements out there where somebody is an income
beneficiary or a principal beneficiary and they
haven't defined those terms specifically, and if we're
now redefining those terms a little bit, then are we
going to start increasing or actually, for some
people, decreasing the amount of money they're
receiving under a trust? That's my big concern.
MR. SHAFTEL said that while he understands the theory of the
concern, he doesn't think it should be a realistic concern. He
elaborated:
I think that there are really several categories that
we have to deal with. There are a number of general
categories dealing with certain types of assets and
the allocation of the proceeds of those assets between
income and principal. Then there is another
classification which is what we call a unitrust. ...
And that is perhaps an area where, at least
theoretically, Representative Gara's concerns would be
more justified in that what happens there is, if you
convert to a unitrust, what the Act provides is that
instead of receiving the net income from a trust, the
beneficiary will receive 4 percent of the assets of
the trust.
Number 1539
MR. SHAFTEL continued:
But before there can be a conversion, the trustee has
to notify all the beneficiaries. And if they object
and feel that it would be unfair, then they're
entitled to have the matter brought before the court
and reviewed by the court as an abuse of discretion on
the part of the [trustee]. But this (indisc.) of
converting to a unitrust (indisc.) the concept of the
power to adjust really are designed, not to reduce
returns for income and principal beneficiaries, but
rather to maximize the returns to both. And this is
allowing the trustee to invest for a total return on
all the assets, and then dividing up that total return
between the income and the principal beneficiaries in
a fair and reasonable manner.
So, I really think the answer, Representative Gara, to
your question is: that is a change in the law that
hasn't existed before. It (indisc.) carefully thought
out, and has a number of safeguards in the [proposed]
statute by way of giving notice to the beneficiaries,
allowing them to object, and allowing for judicial
review. In most situations, the income and principal
beneficiaries are going to be very happy to see that
kind of approach taken by the trustee, because it's
going to be a better return for both of them, rather
than a mediocre compromise approach, which a trustee
is [now] forced to take and which results in mediocre
returns for both income and principal beneficiaries.
Number 1629
MR. SHAFTEL went on to say:
Now, the other aspect of your question, Representative
Gara, would be ..., and this goes to that other
category that we talked about, and that is, is there a
particular kind of asset that a particular trust has
that would result in a different allocation of income
and principal under the '97 Act than under the ['62]
Act, and would this disrupt the expectations of a
person who created a trust and who was relying upon
the '62 Act. And I guess that's conceivable. But ...
there are a couple of things to consider there.
[In the] first place, the person who created that
trust evidentially didn't feel strongly enough about
it to put in a particular allocation and override the
'62 Act or confirm the '62 Act. And, if they did not
do that, then what they're doing is - [the] people who
draft these instruments ... - [they] are saying: "We
are comfortable in adopting what state law is and will
be, as considered by the National Conference of
Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, who draft these
Uniform Principal and Income Acts. And if the law is
changed with respect to [an] allocation which we have
not chosen to specifically override or reaffirm, then
we are comfortable with what the [NCCUSL is]
choosing."
And I really think that is the best way to approach
this problem. And it would be unfair to, for example,
limit application of this Act to only trusts or
estates drafted under documents executed after this
date, because all of those settlors and all of those
individuals who directed that their wills or trusts be
drafted would not have the benefit of these modern
updates that the [NCCUSL has] included in this '97
version of the Act.
CHAIR McGUIRE indicated that it is important to have this kind
of debate whenever updates to existing trusts are considered.
Number 1811
PHIL YOUNKER, SR., Chair, Executive Committee, Board of
Trustees, Alaska Mental Health Trust Authority ("The Trust"),
asked whether the changes suggested by The Trust have been
considered yet.
MR. HOVE indicated that the changes recommended via an April 21,
2003, letter from The Trust's executive director, Jeff Jessee,
have been incorporated into Version U of SB 87.
MR. YOUNKER relayed that those changes will make a big
difference in how The Trust is able to do business in the
future. He thanked the committee for the opportunity to speak
and the sponsor for bringing this issue forward and working with
The Trust on its concerns. He said that as an individual, he is
very pleased to see SB 87 because it is difficult to arrange, in
the present time, for the future allocation of interest and
principal of many of the assets that go into his personal trust.
He concluded by encouraging passage of Version U.
Number 1939
STEPHEN E. GREER, Attorney, said simply that he strongly urges
passage of SB 87, that it has been long overdue, and that he is
a bit embarrassed that Alaska's current principal and income Act
is over 40 years old.
CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that no one else wished to
testify, closed public testimony on SB 87.
The committee took an at-ease from 4:00 p.m. to 4:01 p.m.
Number 2004
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report the proposed (CS) for SB
87, Version 23-LS0366\U, Bannister, 5/2/03, out of committee
with individual recommendations and the accompanying zero fiscal
note. There being no objection, HCS SB 87(JUD) was reported
from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
CONFIRMATION HEARING
Commission on Judicial Conduct
Number 2029
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the committee would next consider
the appointment of Richard L. Burton to the Commission on
Judicial Conduct. She noted that members have Mr. Burton's
resume in their packets.
Number 2038
RICHARD L. BURTON, Appointee, Commission on Judicial Conduct,
remarked simply that he has spent his "entire" life in the
criminal justice field, and that he thinks he has something to
offer that would be of service to the state.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG opined that Mr. Burton is well
qualified.
CHAIR McGUIRE agreed.
Number 2087
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG made a motion to advance from committee
the nomination of Richard L. Burton to the Commission on
Judicial Conduct. There being no objection, the confirmation
was advanced from the House Judiciary Standing Committee.
HB 245 - SUITS & CLAIMS: MILITARY/FIRE/DEFENSE
Number 2100
CHAIR McGUIRE announced that the final order of business would
be HOUSE BILL NO. 245, "An Act relating to certain suits and
claims by members of the military services or regarding acts or
omissions of the organized militia; relating to liability
arising out of certain search and rescue, civil defense,
homeland security, and fire management and firefighting
activities; and providing for an effective date." [Before the
committee was CSHB 245(MLV).]
CHAIR McGUIRE, after ascertaining that the representatives from
the Department of Law and the Department of Military & Veterans'
Affairs wished to comment on proposed amendments and that no one
else wished to testify, closed public testimony on HB 245.
Number 2212
REPRESENTATIVE OGG made a motion to adopt Amendment 1, which
read [original punctuation provided]:
Page 4 line 15
delete "clear + convincing"
add "preponderance of the"
Number 2220
CHAIR McGUIRE objected for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG, in support of Amendment 1, pointed out that
existing statute speaks to "wilful misconduct, gross negligence,
or bad faith", but in Section 7, proposed AS 26.20.140(b) is
changing that to "malice or reckless indifference". He opined
that doing this already appropriately raises the standard and,
therefore, it is excessive to additionally make it so that the
plaintiff must show clear and convincing evidence. He offered
that it is only proper to leave the standard of proof as a
preponderance of the evidence.
Number 2296
GAIL VOIGTLANDER, Assistant Attorney General, Special Litigation
Section, Civil Division (Anchorage), Department of Law (DOL), in
response, said that the court has defined the difference between
"a preponderance of the evidence" and "clear and convincing
evidence" as follows. A preponderance of the evidence must
induce a belief in the minds of the jurors that the asserted
facts are probably true, whereas if clear and convincing proof
is required, there must be induced a belief that the truth of
the asserted facts is highly probable. The reason for proposing
the language of clear and convincing evidence, she explained, is
because being able to move successfully for summary judgment in
a civil lawsuit is increasingly difficult in Alaska.
MS. VOIGTLANDER additionally explained that summary judgment
allows civil cases to be resolved without jury trials and
attendant costs. However, under Alaska's summary judgment
standard, the court may consider summary judgment only if there
are no genuine issues of material fact; furthermore, even if a
fact is undisputed but there could be different inferences drawn
from the undisputed facts, the case has to go to a jury trial.
Therefore, many times, particularly with regard to immunity
cases where it is not an absolute immunity, the individual
defendants are forced to go all the way through trial.
TAPE 03-50, SIDE B
Number 2380
MS. VOIGTLANDER offered the following statistics to illustrate
the costs incurred by the state in its own defense. In the case
pertaining to the "Miller's Reach" fire, defense costs to date
are $2.5 million. In the [Kiokun] case, defense costs to date
are $250,000. In the case which has in part engendered the
intramilitary tort immunity provisions of HB 245, defense costs
to date are $1 million. She offered that immunity is a concept
that is used to protect two things: immunity from liability,
and immunity from suit. So, although any lawsuit can be filed
as long as the filing fee is paid, attorneys that represent
immune defendants want the ability to move quickly for a
judgment on the issue of immunity, and the method by which to do
that is via summary judgment.
MS. VOIGTLANDER posited that by having a clear and convincing
evidence standard, it is more likely that a trial court will be
more comfortable in ruling on a summary judgment, since the
standard would be whether or not a jury would believe that the
asserted facts are highly probable.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA noted that he supported Amendment 1.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG mentioned that courts are very
reluctant to grant summary judgment, particularly if there's a
jury, which, he added, is more often requested by the defense
than the prosecution. He noted that there is a strong "policy"
in Alaska of people helping each other, adding that this is one
of the things that makes Alaska an attractive place to live, and
that [proposed AS 26.20.140(a)] provides the state immunity from
civilian defense workers who may be seriously injured or even
killed while going out of their way to help other Alaskans in
times of crises. He opined that erecting a "clear and
convincing evidence" barrier hurts the wrong group of people.
People won't come forward to help if they think that if they're
injured they won't get recompense, he predicted, adding "we want
to encourage people to help the state and other Alaskans in time
of crises." "I think we should have just a regular, typical
tort standard for these folks; they're a good group of people,
and I don't want to erect another barrier for them," he remarked
in conclusion.
Number 2209
REPRESENTATIVE OGG, referring to Ms. Voigtlander's comments,
said his concern is that the first thing that a person would
have to prove under proposed AS 26.20.140(b), even if the case
goes to summary judgment, is that the individual working on
behalf of the government acted with malice or reckless
indifference to the interests or safety of others. Malice is an
intentional-type tort wherein scienter must be proven, which is
difficult in and of itself. That's the first hurdle that
someone has to get past; then it must also be proven by clear
and convincing evidence. He again opined that that having to
also do the latter creates too high a hurdle.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS, turning to Representative Gruenberg's
comment, said he disagreed; according to his interpretation of
[proposed AS 26.20.140(b)], it would protect the individuals who
are lending assistance.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG noted, however, that those are the
people who are likely to be injured because they are more often
in harm's way; therefore, although they could be defendants,
they could also end up being plaintiffs.
CHAIR McGUIRE offered her belief that there is too much
frivolous litigation, and that there is tremendous cost to the
state - and, thus, Alaskans - because of it. She said that she
agrees with Ms. Voigtlander's comments, and posited that having
a standard of clear and convincing evidence will force someone
bringing a legitimate suit to show that real harm was done.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA argued, however, that although he agrees
that frivolous lawsuits should be deterred, the provision being
addressed by Amendment 1 appears to instead punish those that
bring valid lawsuits against the state by taking away their
remedy. "I don't think it's right to take those rights away to
protect against a different class of claims," he added. With
regard to Representative Samuel's comments, Representative Gara
indicated that he agreed that neither volunteer workers nor
people who get paid should be subject to claims against them for
merely doing their job, even if they do it negligently, though
that is something to guard against. Current law, however, says
that employers are to be held responsible for the conduct of
employees who do their job negligently. That is why, largely,
there are no million-dollar verdicts against individual firemen,
for example, or other individual employees, he surmised, and
thus volunteers are not, largely, going to be held liable
either.
CHAIR McGUIRE pointed out, however, that it is the state and,
ultimately, Alaskan citizens who wind up paying for these
lawsuits in one way or another. She said that she disagrees
with the characterization that having a standard of clear and
convincing evidence is punishing those that bring valid claims;
instead, she considers such a standard to be reasonable. She
relayed that she is maintaining her objection to Amendment 1
[text provided previously].
Number 1869
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Gruenberg, Ogg, and
Gara voted in favor of Amendment 1. Representatives Holm,
Samuels, and McGuire voted against it. Therefore, Amendment 1
failed by a vote of 3-3.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA said to Ms. Voigtlander, "First of all, one
of the protections that a defendant receives is that before a
plaintiff wins, they have to receive a majority jury verdict."
MS. VOIGTLANDER noted that for a jury of twelve, ten must agree
to the verdict; for a jury of six, four must agree.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA noted that there has been considerable
testimony during HB 245's previous hearings regarding second
guessing decisions that are made by the government during search
and rescue operations, civil defense operations, and
firefighting activities. However, he pointed out, juries are
specifically instructed to not second-guess. He asked whether
it is correct to say that in cases involving emergency
situations, juries are specifically instructed to look at all
the circumstances in order to determine whether the state acted
reasonably.
MS. VOIGTLANDER said that although it would be difficult to
address the specific jury instructions given in any particular
case, because instructions are highly variable depending on what
is advocated by both sides and agreed to by the judge, in the
case involving the Miller's Reach fire, the jury was simply
instructed to consider whether or not the defendant - the
Division of Forestry - breached the standard of care of a
reasonable person.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA posited, though, that the jury in that case
was also instructed, in deciding whether the state was
reasonable, to consider "all of the circumstances." That's how
juries are commonly instructed, he concluded.
Number 1710
MS. VOIGTLANDER, indicating that there are different standard
jury instructions, said that she did not know which,
specifically, was used in that case, or whether it contained
anything specific to emergency situations. She acknowledged,
though, that in terms of "the usual instruction, it would be
taking all the evidence that's presented to the jury and then
for the jury to make a decision based upon the evidence that is
allowed in at trial."
REPRESENTATIVE GARA surmised, then, that Ms. Voigtlander would
not disagree that a jury is ultimately instructed to consider
all the circumstances and that if there was an emergency
situation, that would be one of the relevant circumstances that
would be considered.
MS. VOIGTLANDER replied that she is not comfortable agreeing
with that summation.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA asked whether, in any of the aforementioned
cases, the state was prevented from having the jury consider the
fact that a case involved an emergency situation.
MS. VOIGTLANDER said that although there were some issues that
were taken away from the jury in the [Kiokun] case, she couldn't
say whether the fact that it was an emergency situation was one
of them, or whether, in any of the other cases, that fact was
kept from the jury. She added:
Beyond that, ... all I can say is that as a general
concept, I would assume that generally, the
instructions are for the jury to consider all the
evidence that's before it and answer the questions,
which they are given as special verdicts, based upon
legal concepts. And those legal concepts are highly
variable, depending on what's advocated by both sides.
It's very difficult to generalize about jury
instructions in specific cases because, my experience
is, they are highly variable.
Number 1604
CHAIR McGUIRE noted that at the request of Representative Holm,
the attorney general's office has sent a request that the
committee limit its discussion of cases.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG asked Representative Gara what the relevance
of his line of questioning is.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA indicated that his goal is to illustrate to
the committee that although the administration, in requesting
that the laws be changed to provide immunity to the state for
negligence conduct in emergency situations, is using the
argument that it doesn't want juries second-guessing decisions
made at the time those situations are occurring, it is not a
fair argument because juries currently aren't allowed to do that
anyway without parameters. Instead, there is a "pattern jury
instruction" in emergency cases, he relayed, and this
instruction says in part: "In an emergency, the person is not
expected or required to use the same judgment and care that is
required in calmer and more deliberate moments." Thus juries do
take the circumstances of an emergency into account; they do
take the relevant circumstances into account.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, after some discussion on the difficulty of
discussing a bill and/or portions of a bill that relate to
specific cases without also being able to discuss those cases,
turned attention to Section 2 of HB 245, and surmised that it
would exempt the state from liability for its negligent conduct
during a search and rescue [situation]. In other words, if HB
245 is adopted with Section 2 as written, the state can no
longer be held liable for failing to reasonably respond in a
search and rescue [situation], or even when it is negligent in
responding to a search and rescue request. He then began
discussion of a couple of the facts that the jury found
persuasive in the [Kiokun] case, for which that verdict against
the state is a matter of public record. Representative Gara
began:
In the case involving the Denali Highway failure, ...
three people, for whatever reason - and it seems odd
to me ... - ended up driving along the Denali Highway
in the middle of the winter and they got stuck. And
that's not a big surprise to anybody; they drove in
the middle of the winter and they got stuck. On that
day that they got stuck, a snow machiner came by and
they saw the word "HELP" written in the snow, and they
didn't see anybody in the car. And within a matter of
two hours, and this was undisputed, they went back to
the trooper station and said, "I just saw this 'HELP'
sign located next to a vacant car, there are subzero
temperatures, and I didn't see the people in the car
anymore." This was undisputed.
Number 1342
REPRESENTATIVE GARA continued:
And it took three days for the troopers to send a
helicopter to the Denali Highway to look for these
folks. And ultimately, when the helicopter arrived,
within a couple of hours they found three frozen
bodies. The jury found that the state didn't respond
in time. It was undisputed that two of the troopers
involved were reprimanded. It was undisputed that the
trooper chief appropriately said, "We could have done
a much better job." The jury found that that was a
negligent response and they held the state liable.
There was other evidence, that the jury didn't
necessarily believe, that supported the other side.
But these are the kinds of cases we're going to
prevent from being brought in the future. And I would
suggest that there was a beneficial result of that
case. ... The beneficial result of that case is, it
sent a message within the troopers that, at least in
this case, they could have done a better job. And I
suspect [that] within the troopers maybe there are
better, stronger precautions to prevent this kind of
thing from happening again in the future. That's not
to say that there was a great reason for the family to
drive along the Denali Highway in the first place ...
in the middle of the winter.
But I'm very uncomfortable telling the state that it's
not liable for this kind of conduct in the future,
because I think it sends a message to the state that
if it's not going to be held responsible, and not held
accountable for conduct like this, then it will be
okay for the state to engage in conduct like this
again in the future. So, I don't have an amendment, I
just ... don't think I can support the bill. But I
just needed to get this discussion out on the table
because this is the context; this is the reality of
the kinds of case we're going to prevent from being
filed in the future, and I think there are positives
and negatives of preventing people from filing claims
like this.
Number 1212
CHAIR McGUIRE relayed that she appreciated Representative Gara's
point and his putting it on the record.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS said he disagrees that stopping such
cases is a bad thing. He opined that people should accept
personal responsibility for their actions and not put the onus
on [the state] to come and rescue them.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA suggested, however, that such decisions
should not be made in a vacuum, and although Representative
Samuels is correct in that there should be personal
responsibility and people should be held accountable for their
own failures, the law is not that ignorant. The truth, he
surmised, is that if one causes his/her own harm - for example,
driving along the Denali Highway in the middle of winter when
that should probably not be done - the jury is asked to
apportion negligence. The jury is asked, in making its
determination: Did these people who drove along some particular
highway in the middle of the winter, were they negligent for
doing that? Did they lead to their own death? And if the
actions of those people also contributed to their death, the
jury is then asked to attribute a percentage of negligence to
the people who got themselves in trouble and a percentage of
negligence to the people who failed to help them.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA reiterated that the jury is asked to look at
all of the circumstances, adding that before the committee
changes the law, it should understand what the current law is.
For example, under current law, if the state doesn't have the
staff to conduct a search and rescue operation, it is not held
liable for those budgetary constraints; a jury can't second-
guess the state when the state has budgetary constraints and
doesn't have staff. So, to the extent that there were no search
and rescue people available, the state wouldn't be held liable
for failing to send people out; to the extent that there were
search and rescue people available, then the state might be held
responsible, he concluded.
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS remarked that had the [Kiokun] trial been
held in Paxson or Cantwell, he would probably have "a little
less heartburn with the results."
Number 1021
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM brought attention to what ultimately became
known as Amendment 2, which read [original punctuation
provided]:
Amendment 1
On page 3, line 31 to line 1 of page 4: Delete "or
homeland security"
Page 4, lines 8,9: delete both "or homeland security"
occurrences.
Amendment 2 (conceptual)
All other references to "homeland security" workers
which would be effected by the deletions in section 7,
should be removed from HB 245.
Number 1014
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM made a motion to adopt [the first part of]
Amendment 2 [that portion labeled "Amendment 1"].
Number 0994
CHAIR McGUIRE objected for the purpose of discussion.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM said that he wants to remove "homeland
security" from "this same group of folks who are being given
this high level of evidence [standard], to lessen the evidence
[standard] to probable cause." He then read as follows from [a
document that apparently summarized Sec. 802 of] the Uniting and
Strengthening America by Providing Appropriate Tools Required to
Intercept and Obstruct Terrorism (USA PATRIOT ACT) Act of 2001
("USA PATRIOT Act"):
Section 802 of the Act, borrowing from the definition
of international terrorism contained in 18 U.S.C. 2331
creates the federal crime of domestic terrorism.
Among other things, this section states that acts
committed within the United States "dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws" can be
considered acts of domestic terrorism if they "appear
to be intended ... to influence the policy of a
government by intimidation or coercion" or "to
intimidate or coerce a civilian population".
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM went on to say:
Now, ... because people who come and help us that are
[firefighters], police, military, search and rescue
folks [perform] services that are demanded by the
people, we have one set of circumstances. But
homeland security is largely a service that's been
thrust upon the people of the United States by the
federal government. And I suspect that ... the two
are not of the same motivation. If the ambulance or
police or fire department show up, you probably called
them. In the course of their requested duties they
should have proposed protections in this bill, and I
agree with those.
But if armed homeland security workers stop and search
your car, or enter your home without a warrant, or
prohibit you from travel, you probably didn't call or
request it. And so, if your rights are trampled or
you are injured in that process, you should have
maximum recourse. And so, Madame Chair, I
respectfully submit that the probable cause is a
lesser ... evidence requirement that should be in
place so that people would protect their personal
rights.
Number 0820
SAM JOHNSON, Assistant Commissioner, Office of Homeland
Security, Department of Military & Veterans' Affairs (DMVA), in
response to a question by Chair McGuire, said that the roles of
homeland security and emergency services are almost identical in
the response phase of an event, be it an earthquake or an
anthrax scare - or an actual event. The things that are
different are the mitigation pieces that happen before the
event. In the case of an earthquake, tsunami, et cetera, the
community is prepared; plans, including evacuation plans, are
written; and in the case of floods, dykes and other things of
that nature may be built. In the case of homeland security, the
process is much the same, although infrastructure and similar
aspects are looked at with the goal of protecting and hardening
those that are most critical.
MR. JOHNSON offered the following:
For example, we would prioritize those assets in the
state that were most critical, then we would write a
plan to harden those facilities with added security
measures such as lights, camera, and fences. And then
we would write a plan to increase security. For
example, the pipeline: there are a number of security
personnel on the pipeline in condition "yellow," but
when we go to condition "orange," if the circumstances
so dictated, we would use either the Alaska Defense
Force or the National Guard to provide those security
measures. If we went to condition "red" on a
particular asset such as the pipeline, and we got into
a defensive role, then we would most likely use the
National Guard asset.
Day to day, however, ... homeland security people do
not carry guns. We do not arrest, detain, seize,
search, nor do investigations, nor intelligence; we
have no internal intelligence mechanisms or
surveillance. Yes, we do interface with those
agencies that do have those capabilities as their core
competencies: The FBI [Federal Bureau of
Investigation], the CIA [Central Intelligence Agency],
the OSI [Office of Special Investigations], the
attorney general, et cetera.
Number 0795
But we would not be those people, in the Office of
Homeland Security, that would go listen to a wiretap,
or would surveil someone's home, or surveil anything
of any nature. And we would never be the person at
your door knocking with the intention of taking you
into custody. That is not our role. Our role is to
identify potential threats to minimize the capability
of the enemy to attack us at critical infrastructure,
and then work with those first responders - fire,
rescue, medical, state troopers, et cetera - to make
sure that we have a coordinated effort to protect the
citizens of Alaska.
CHAIR McGUIRE asked whether Transportation Security
Administration (TSA) workers would be considered homeland
security workers under HB 245.
MR. JOHNSON said that they are not, since they work for the
federal government rather than the state. Additionally, he
indicated that TSA workers would not be considered contractors
as described in proposed AS 26.20.140(c)(3).
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM asked whether the term "members of the
organized militia", as used in Section 3, would be "akin to the
Alaska Defense Force."
MR. JOHNSON said yes, adding, "in those definitions [they] would
be army, air, naval militia, and state defense force."
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM pointed out, however, that contrary to Mr.
Johnson's statement that homeland security workers do not carry
guns, the Alaska Defense Force is an armed body. He remarked:
Because it is an armed body and there are no
requirements for heavy degrees of police academies and
those types of things, ... there is a much ... less
qualified ... group of folks to act in the capacity of
protecting the rights of the citizens of Alaska, in
the zeal to do their job.
Number 0542
BRIGADIER GENERAL CRAIG CHRISTENSEN, Assistant Adjutant General
Army Director, Alaska Army National Guard (AK ARNG), Department
of Military & Veterans' Affairs (DMVA), said that Representative
Holm is correct in that the organized militia (indisc.) state
defense force does not have the proficiency and training of a
law enforcement officer of the state such as a state trooper or
a municipal law enforcement officer. However, in previous
engagements, members of the state defense force and members of
the National Guard have been required to go through law
enforcement training and "rules of engagement" prior to being on
the streets or engaged in those types of activities.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM indicated that he is questioning whether, as
a general policy for Alaska, homeland security workers ought to
be included on the same level as other state employees with
regard to immunity from suit during the course of their duties.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG asked where the Coast Guard fits in.
MR. JOHNSON relayed that the U.S. Coast Guard would fall under
the federal office of homeland security because it is a federal
agency.
CHAIR McGUIRE mentioned that her concern with the homeland
security provisions of HB 245 revolves around the fact that the
definition of homeland security worker still seems too broad and
nebulous. She noted that there are a lot of concerns on the
part of Alaskans with regard to the USA PATRIOT Act and how far
things are going in the area of homeland security. She referred
to Section 8, which defines who could be considered a homeland
security worker, and indicated that proposed AS 26.20.140(c),
especially paragraph (2), seems overbroad.
MS. VOIGTLANDER, in an effort to allay Chair McGuire's concern,
observed that Section 10 of HB 245 describes what the duties of
a homeland security worker would entail. In addition, all those
listed in proposed AS 26.20140(c) would be acting in an official
capacity or at the direction of the state. She surmised that
homeland security workers would simply be doing as Mr. Johnson
indicated, that is, assisting first responders and performing
identified missions with regard to critical infrastructure
issues.
TAPE 03-51, SIDE A
Number 0050
CHAIR McGUIRE pointed out, however, that the language in Section
10 also refers to detection, prevention, preemption, and
deterrence. She asked, therefore, whether an individual hired
to enforce the USA PATRIOT Act in Alaska's libraries - to
monitor the Internet activities of Alaskan citizens and which
books they check out - would be included in the definition of
homeland security worker. If such an individual committed a
tort against someone, is that individual engaged in homeland
security and thus immunized by HB 245?
MS. VOIGTLANDER replied that according to her understanding of
the USA PATRIOT Act, "its authorization is to the federal
government." So if the federal government were to hire someone
to work at its request, he/she would be a federal employee
rather than a state employee. House Bill 245, in contrast, is
"looking at state and local types of entities, rather than
federal entities." She added that although HB 245 would limit
some types of tort lawsuits, it would not and could not limit an
individual's right to file a civil-rights action against whoever
has abridged his/her federally guaranteed constitutional rights.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA pointed out, though, that a civil-rights
action is quite a difficult action to prove; one has to prove
more than just negligence.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM said that he is becoming more and more
convinced that he would like to see all reference to homeland
security removed. He opined that the definition of homeland
security is too vague, and mentioned that he did not want the
citizens of the state to be subject to the same type of onerous
restrictions as are currently placed on people who travel by
air.
Number 0297
CHAIR McGUIRE removed her objection to Representative Holm's
motion to adopt the first portion of Amendment 2.
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG requested that both portions be
combined to form Amendment 2.
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM said he had no objections to doing so.
Number 0360
REPRESENTATIVE HOLM made a motion to adopt Amendment 2 [in its
entirety; text provided previously]. There being no objection,
Amendment 2 was adopted.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, on the issue of HB 245, said he is
wondering if the problem the bill is purported to be in response
to really exists. He asked whether there have really been
enough cases to justify such legislation, specifically as it
pertains to military workers.
REPRESENTATIVE GAIL relayed that there have been two cases
pertaining to intramilitary tort, and that in one of those
cases, the state's cost to defend was $1 million and its share
of the judgment was $2.75 million. She surmised that in the
past, the Feres doctrine has prohibited such cases, but because
of a recent Alaska Supreme Court decision, which takes the state
in the opposite direction, the administration is anticipating
more such cases.
REPRESENTATIVE GARA, on the issue of whether the aforementioned
claims were frivolous, noted that if the state is being required
to pay a portion of a judgment, it is because the claim against
the state was valid.
REPRESENTATIVE OGG, remarking that the vote on Amendment 1 was a
close vote, requested that the bill be held over so that the
full committee could vote on Amendment 1.
CHAIR McGUIRE denied the request, and suggested instead that
Representative Ogg offer the amendment on the House floor, where
it could be voted on by the entire body.
Number 0681
REPRESENTATIVE SAMUELS moved to report CSHB 245(MLV), as
amended, out of committee with individual recommendations and
the accompanying fiscal notes.
Number 0692
REPRESENTATIVE GRUENBERG objected.
A roll call vote was taken. Representatives Ogg, Holm, Samuels,
and McGuire voted in favor of reporting the bill from committee.
Representatives Gara and Gruenberg voted against it. Therefore,
CSHB 245(JUD) was reported out of the House Judiciary Standing
Committee by a vote of 4-2.
ADJOURNMENT
Number 0731
There being no further business before the committee, the House
Judiciary Standing Committee meeting was adjourned at 5:10 p.m.
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